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Abstract
Two prominent cognitive capacity limitations are the maximal number of objects we
can place in working memory (WM) and the maximal number of objects we can track
in a display. Both are believed to have a numeric value of 3 or 4, which has led to the
proposal that we have a general cognitive capacity, and that this capacity is most likely
linked to limitations of how many objects we can attend simultaneously. Based on
previous results showing that we can memorize more objects if they come from different
categories than if they come from the same category (e.g., Feigenson & Halberda, 2008;
Wood, 2008; Wong, Peterson, & Thompson, 2008), we compare how category-based
grouping affects performance for WM and multiple object tracking (MOT). We present
participants with either “pure” displays of either cars or faces, or with “mixed” displays
of cars and faces. Overall, the effects of category are weak. In some analyses but not
others, we replicate the mixed advantage for WM, albeit with a small effect size. In
contrast, we observe a weak pure advantage for MOT tasks, at least in a meta-analysis
of five experiments, but not in all experiments. Accordingly, WM and MOT tasks
differed significantly in their sensitivity to category membership. We also find that WM
is slightly better for faces than for cars, but that no such difference exists for MOT. We
tentatively suggest that cognitive capacity limitations in different domains are at least
partially due to limitations of distinct mechanisms.
Keywords: Working memory; Interference; Temporary Memory; Memory Capacity
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Introduction
In one of his classic papers, Miller (1956) noted that people seem to have similar
cognitive capacities across a variety of domains, which he called the magical number 7,
plus or minus 2. This suggested that we might have a common cognitive capacity that
is used by many cognitive processes. While Miller (1956) used the magical number more
as a rhetorical device than an accurate estimate (Cowan, 2001), and while the magical
number might be closer to 4 than to 7 (Cowan, 2001), relatively little research has
directly addressed the relation between capacity limitations in different domains
(Cowan, 2015).
Two of the most prominent cognitive capacity limitations are the maximal number
of items we can place in working memory (WM), and the maximal number of items we
can attend to. Specifically, in those theories of Working Memory (WM) that posit
discrete memory capacities (e.g., Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007; Luck & Vogel, 1997;
Miller, 1956; Cowan, 2005; Rouder et al., 2008; W. Zhang & Luck, 2008; but see Alvarez
& Cavanagh, 2004; Bays & Husain, 2008; Bays, Catalao, & Husain, 2009; van den Berg,
Shin, Chou, George, & Ma, 2012 for authors holding WM to be a continuous resource),
WM is often considered to have a constant capacity of 3 or 4 items.
Likewise, the number of items we can attend to is usually measured in multiple
object tracking (MOT) experiments. In such experiments, participants have to follow
target objects among identical distractors while the objects move randomly on the
screen. The classic result holds that we can track about 3 or 4 of such items (Pylyshyn
& Storm, 1988; Scholl & Pylyshyn, 1999).
There is a third cognitive capacity that is limited to 3 or 4 but that we will not
investigate in the current experiments: the number of items we can enumerate exactly
without counting (Jevons, 1871; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994), a capacity that is called
subitizing. If we see 3 or 4 dots on a screen, we know immediately and exactly how
many dots we see. In contrast, if we have to enumerate more items under time pressure,
we can only make an approximate estimate of the number of items. Hence, the
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enumeration error is constant and close to zero up to 3 or 4 objects, and then grows
proportionally to the number of items to be enumerated, yielding a Fechner-Weber
pattern (Izard & Dehaene, 2008; Revkin, Piazza, Izard, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2008).
The observation that all of these cognitive capacities are limited to 3 or 4 has led
to the proposal that they might rely on a common mechanism, and that this mechanism
might be attention. Specifically, our ability to enumerate 3 or 4 items exactly and
immediately might rely on the same mechanisms that allow us to track 3 or 4 items
attentionally (e.g., Chesney & Haladjian, 2011; Feigenson, Carey, & Hauser, 2002;
Knops, Piazza, Sengupta, Eger, & Melcher, 2014; Piazza, Fumarola, Chinello, &
Melcher, 2011; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994), be it through a system of attentional pointers
or through an object-file system.1
Likewise, according one of the most prominent models of WM (Cowan, 2005),
WM capacity limitations are really limitations of attention. Specifically, in his and
other models (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Engle, 2002; Oberauer, 2002), we need to
attend to items in memory to prevent them from disappearing from memory through
forgetting and interference. As we can attend only to 3 or 4 items, we have a WM
capacity of 3 or 4 items. Hence, WM, subitizing, and attention are thought to have a
common capacity, and this capacity is due to attention.
In the current experiments, we address the relationship between WM and
attentional tracking by comparing their functional properties. Specifically, we ask
whether these cognitive capacities differ in their sensitivity to the category structure of
the items they have to remember and track, respectively.
Evidence for a general cognitive capacity
While there are few direct tests of the view that a general cognitive capacity
underlies capacity limitations in different domains, it receives support from a number of
results. For example, Piazza et al. (2011) observed that visual WM capacity correlated
1Trick and Pylyshyn (1994) argued against a common mechanism between WM and subitizing, and
argued that the spatial pointers called FINSTs that allow us to track objects are pre-attentive. However,
as we will discuss below, other authors argued that small-number processing might be related to WM
via attention, and used MOT as a measure of attention.
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with subitizing capacity, and explained this finding with the hypothesis that both
mechanisms relied on the parallel individuation system (though the relationship
between WM and subitizing does not seem to hold up when WM is measured with
complex span tasks; Tuholski, Engle, & Baylis, 2001). In line with this view, Chesney
and Haladjian (2011) found that the more items participants had to track in a MOT
task, the more errors they made in a simultaneous subitizing task (that is, tracking
more items increased their coefficient of variation, and thus reduced their subitizing
capacity). Further, a verbal WM task reduced the subitizing capacity to a lesser extent
than MOT, at least when participants had to remember 3 letters, suggesting that the
subitizing capacity might be specifically impaired by a visual task.
However, in Chesney and Haladjian’s (2011) experiments, the subitizing display
was presented for just 50 ms. As a result, it was presumably quite easy to miss while
performing a demanding visual task such as MOT. Further, subitizing requires
attentional resources (Burr, Turi, & Anobile, 2010). Consequently, to enumerate the
items in the subitizing display, participants needed to disengage from the MOT stimuli
and to select the enumeration stimuli. Both aspects of the task might plausibly increase
subitizing errors even if subitizing and MOT did not rely on the same processes. In line
with this view, the verbal WM task also reduced subitizing capacities, albeit only when
participants had to remember 5 letters.
The relationship between tracking and WM is similarly unclear. Different authors
have used an individual difference approach to investigate the interrelations among
different types of attentional processing. For example, both Oksama and Hyo¨na¨ (2004)
and Huang, Mo, and Li (2012) found that MOT performance correlated with measures
of visual WM, confirming that attentional tracking and WM might be related.
However, Oksama and Hyo¨na¨ (2004) also showed that MOT correlates not only
with visual WM but also with verbal WM when people have to track the identity of
items on top of their positions. Similarly, Huang et al. (2012) found a correlation
between MOT and counting speed outside of the subitizing range, as well as with other
tasks that have no obvious relation to attentional pointers or object files (e.g., with the
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reaction time to report the color of an item). As a result, it is unclear what these
correlations mean in terms of the underlying psychological mechanisms. In fact, Huang
et al. (2012) used no less than 18 different tasks, and showed that performance on most
of them correlated with a general “attention” factor that might well reflect how vigilant
or compliant participants are during the experiment.
Doubts about a general cognitive capacity
While the results discussed so far do not provide unambiguous evidence for a
general cognitive capacity, there are also other observations that are problematic for the
view that cognitive capacity limitations are due to the limitations of a parallel attention
system. First, dual-task experiments revealed only limited interference between
attentional tasks and WM tasks (e.g., Fougnie & Marois, 2006; Hollingworth & Hwang,
2013; H. Zhang, Xuan, Fu, & Pylyshyn, 2010), a result that would be unexpected if WM
and attention relied on the same mechanism. That said, there clearly are interactions
between MOT and WM. For example, WM might help binding features (e.g., colors) to
objects that are tracked (Makovski & Jiang, 2009b). However, our tracking abilities and
our WM abilities still seem to interfere remarkably little with each other.
Second, neither attention nor WM might necessarily have a capacity of 3 or 4.
When objects move slowly, we can track up to 8 of them, and when they move very fast,
only a single one (Alvarez & Franconeri, 2007; Franconeri, Jonathan, & Scimeca, 2010;
Holcombe & Chen, 2012). Likewise, the capacity of WM might not be fixed either, but
rather depend on other factors such as the complexity of the stimuli (e.g., Alvarez &
Cavanagh, 2004; Eng, Chen, & Jiang, 2005), their familiarity (e.g., Feigenson, 2008;
Jackson & Raymond, 2008) their confusability (e.g., Baddeley, 1966; Conrad, 1963;
Conrad & Hull, 1964; Viswanathan, Perl, Visscher, Kahana, & Sekuler, 2010), the
degree to which they can be perceived categorically (Olsson & Poom, 2005), the
presence of proactive interference among items (Banta Lavenex, Boujon,
Ndarugendamwo, & Lavenex, 2015; Endress & Potter, 2014; Sands & Wright, 1980), the
spatial configuration of the items (e.g., Makovski, 2016), and on the specific stimuli. For
example, Cowan, Johnson, and Saults (2005) observed memory capacities of about 6
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words (under high proactive interference), while Wood (2008) observed memory
capacities of only 2 actions.
Third, in a general sense, memory and some forms of attention (though not
necessarily the tracking variety) are certainly related. For example, attention is critical
to place items in memory to begin with (see, among many others, e.g., Chen & Cowan,
2009; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Lepsien & Nobre, 2007; Majerus et al., 2014; Morey &
Bieler, 2013; Vergauwe, Camos, & Barrouillet, 2014). Further, recent physiological data
suggest that, at least in some situations, WM limitations might be in part encoding
limitations (e.g., Buschman, Siegel, Roy, & Miller, 2011; Tsubomi, Fukuda, Watanabe,
& Vogel, 2013). Conversely, WM might also support attention. For example, and as
mentioned above, WM might help binding features to objects that are tracked (e.g.,
Makovski & Jiang, 2009b). Further, items that are maintained in WM attract attention
in unrelated search tasks, suggesting that WM might even guide attention (e.g.,
Downing, 2000; see also Awh & Jonides, 2001 for a review).
However, the mechanistic basis for this two-way interaction between WM and
attention is unclear. Directing attention away from a stimulus certainly impairs
performance on tasks using this stimulus (see Awh & Jonides, 2001 for a review of the
WM literature, but also Toro, Sinnett, & Soto-Faraco, 2005; Turk-Browne, Junge´, &
Scholl, 2005, for similar results in rather different domains such as statistical learning).
However, such results only show that items need suitable encoding conditions for
appropriate processing, but it is unclear to what extent attentional tracking capacities
are required. Likewise, while WM can certainly guide attention, so can LTM, even when
participants never had any reason to memorize the stimulus features that guide
attention (Fan & Turk-Browne, 2016).2 Given that items in LTM are clearly not
2In Fan and Turk-Browne’s (2016) experiments, participants first encoded either the position or the
color of a novel shape, a manipulation that affects LTM for the stimulus dimension that was encoded
and probed (Fan & Turk-Browne, 2013). Following this encoding phase, participants completed a 1-item
delayed match-to-sample task with monochrome versions of these shapes. Critically, in the retention
interval, participants viewed two colored Gabor patches, and had to decide which of them was tilted.
One of the patches had the color that the memory object had during the encoding phase, and the other
patch a different color. Participants were faster to detect the target (i.e., the tilted shape) if it shared
the color that the memory object had during the encoding phase, suggesting that LTM representations
can guide attention.
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actively maintained by attentional mechanisms, this suggests that attentional guidance
from memory representations does not rely on attentional processing in memory.
The current experiments
The results reviewed so far are certainly problematic for the general capacity view.
However, they do not rule it out. That is, the numeric value of the capacities might not
be fixed, but the nature of these limitations might still be the same.
Here, we ask whether attention and WM rely on a common mechanism by
comparing their functional properties. Specifically, participants had to track or
remember items in a display. The items were either all from the same category (faces or
cars; hereafter “pure” displays), or mixed both categories (faces and cars; hereafter
“mixed” displays). We asked whether attention and memory would show a benefit or a
cost for mixed compared to pure displays. (In the experiments below, items in “mixed”
displays differ both in their category membership and their composition of visual
features; when we refer to mixed or pure displays below, we always refer to this
experiment situation.)
We selected faces and cars as contrasting categories, because evidence suggests
that objects and humans are processed differentially early in development (e.g., Bonatti,
Frot, Zangl, & Mehler, 2002) and have a different brain representation in adulthood
(e.g., Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999; Kanwisher, McDermott, &
Chun, 1997), suggesting that participants likely see them as members of distinct
categories.
Our predictions are as follows. With respect to WM, there is a considerable
literature showing that it is easier to memorize items from different categories than
items from only one category (Feigenson & Halberda, 2008; Wood, 2008; Wong et al.,
2008). While it has been suggested that the increase in memory capacity might be due
to the availability of independent memory stores for items from different categories, it is
also possible that using different categories reduces interference among memory items,
and thus improves performance (Endress & Szabo´, in press). Be that as it might, we
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would expect mixed displays to be easier to remember than pure displays.
With respect to MOT, previous research is ambiguous as to whether pure sets
should be harder or easier to track than mixed sets. On the one hand, when targets in
MOT experiments can be grouped based on different features, tracking performance is
somewhat improved (e.g., Erlikhman, Keane, Mettler, Horowitz, & Kellman, 2013;
Sto¨rmer, Li, Heekeren, & Lindenberger, 2011; see Keane, Mettler, Tsoi, & Kellman,
2011, for non-feature-based grouping results). However, MOT performance is also
impaired when targets are grouped with distractors (e.g., Erlikhman et al., 2013; Keane
et al., 2011; Scholl, Pylyshyn, & Feldman, 2001; Sto¨rmer et al., 2011). Crucially, when
each target has a “paired” distractor it shares a feature with (while the features are
different across target-distractor pairs), performance is worse than when all items share
this feature. For example, Makovski and Jiang (2009a) used colored digits as stimuli. In
the “paired digit” condition, the digits 1, 2, 4 and 7 would appear both as targets and as
distractors, such that each digit would appear exactly twice in a display. Results showed
that performance in this condition was worse compared to a condition where all eight
digits were identical (e.g., all consisted of the digit 1). However, while Makovski and
Jiang (2009a) found a similar disadvantage when targets and distractors were paired in
both digit identity and digit color, color-based pairing was insufficient to yield such an
disadvantage (see also Horowitz et al., 2007, who did not find a significant disadvantage
in the paired condition, using cartoon animals as stimuli).3 Given these results, we
would expect better MOT performance for pure displays compared to mixed displays
(or equivalent performance in both kinds of displays). Crucially, we will ask whether the
effect of display composition is different between WM and MOT tasks.
In sum, we would expect a memory advantage for mixed displays, and a tracking
advantage for pure displays. This expectation also appears to make intuitive sense.
While memory performance can be improved by grouping items (e.g., through
3In principle, it is possible that the very presence of distinct objects has a tracking cost compared to
a homogenous tracking condition, because identifying the objects might distract resources from tracking
even if the object identity is irrelevant for the task. This is particularly plausible because, at least in
the case of WM, participants seem to encode the locations of objects relatively automatically (Makovski
& Jiang, 2008). Empirically, however, tracking is improved if items have unique features (Makovski &
Jiang, 2009a).
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chunking), object tracking requires keeping targets separate from distractors.
However, there is an important limitation of this design. Even if MOT and WM
have different properties with respect to category-based grouping, it would only show
that some mechanisms involved in these tasks are separable, but not that there are no
shared mechanisms that are involved in both tasks. Here, we thus address only the most
extreme version of a shared capacity view, namely that the mechanisms involved in WM
and object-tracking are identical. Given the current state of the art, we believe that the
assessment of the status of the simplest hypothesis is a first step towards a fuller
understanding of the relationship between different cognitive capacities.
To foreshadow our results, we found that memory is slightly better in mixed
displays, whereas tracking works slightly better with pure displays. WM and MOT
might thus rely on distinct capacities. However, these effects were weak and not
consistent across experiments. While this limits the generality of our results, we believe
that the current data are problematic for the stronger version of the shared capacity
view. For readability, we first present meta-analyses of our experiments (as well as
analyses treating the different experiments as one big experiment), and then report
analyses of individual experiments.
Materials and methods
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a Philips 109B 19′′ CRT monitor at a resolution of 1024
× 768 pixels and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The experiment was administered in a
soundproofed booth and was run using EventIDE (http://www.okazolab.com).
Materials
In the MOT experiments, stimuli were a frontal view of the face of Lionel Messi
and a frontal view of a compact car (Seat Cordoba). We selected these stimuli because
they represent one of the best-known soccer player and best selling cars in Spain. Each
image spanned 53 × 53 pixels (approximately 3.8 × 3.8o at a typical view distance for
60 cm). In the WM experiments, stimuli were frontal views of faces of FC Barcelona
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players and frontal views of various cars. Each image measured 75 × 75 pixels
(approximately 5.4 × 5.4o at a typical view distance for 60 cm). We used a total of 12
images for each category.
Procedure
Multiple Object Tracking. Participants were informed that they would see 12
moving objects in each trial. They were told that, at the beginning of each trial, some
of them would blink, and that their task was to follow them. Each trial started with a
fixation cross (30 × 30 pixels; 2.2 × 2.2o) for 1000 ms. Then all objects would appear.
After a delay of 300 ms, the target objects would blink for 4.8 s at a frequency of 5 Hz.
The objects started moving 300 ms after they had stopped blinking, for a tracking
period of 10 s.
The stimuli were either 12 faces, 12 cars (pure conditions), or 6 cars and 6 faces
(mixed condition). Each condition was equally represented among the trials (except in
Experiment 3a, where mixed trials were twice as frequent as either pure condition). The
number of targets (among 12 objects in total) are given in Table 1. In the mixed
condition, half of the targets (and half of the distractors) came from either category.
The initial positions of the objects defined by random polar coordinates relatively
the screen center. The polar angle (θ) was randomly chosen between 0 and 360 degrees,
whereas the polar eccentricity (R) was random chosen between 0 and 9.5 dva (266
pixels).
To avoid overlap between the objects, we constructed imaginary circles inscribing
the objects, and discarded the stimulus positions when the circles corresponding to two
objects overlapped. As a result, distances between stimulus centers were greater than
106 pixels.
Motion trajectories for all 12 objects were precalculated at the start of every trial.
They were represented as series of object positions separated by 32 ms frames. Each
object started moving in a random direction and speed. In each of the following frames,
the position of each object was updated (i) according to its current velocity in the x and
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the y direction, (ii) by a repulsive component in the x direction that increased
exponentially (σ = .018) as the object approached the left or the right screen boundary,
(iii) by a repulsive component in the y direction that increased exponentially (σ = .018)
as the object approached the top or the bottom screen boundary, and (iv) by repulsive
components away from each of the other objects whose magnitude was a negative
exponential function (σ = .2) of the objects’ mutual distance. The repulsive
components prevented the objects from colliding with each other and the screen
boundaries. Details for this algorithm are given in Appendix A. Further, with a change
probability of 0.1, a new speed was selected randomly between the maximum and the
minimum velocity; these differed across the experiments, and are given in Table 1.
After the motion stopped, tracking performance was evaluated in one of two ways.
In the “yes/no” method (after Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988), one object was highlighted by
a green mask immediately after the objects stopped moving. Participants had to
indicate whether the highlighted object was among those they had tracked. If it was,
they had to press the up-arrow key, otherwise the down-arrow key. After their response,
participants received feedback for 2000 ms: For correct answers, they were shown a
green plus sign, and for incorrect answers a red minus sign.
In the “click-all” method, all objects turned into white circles after their
movements stopped. As there were 6 targets among 6 distractors, participants had to
select 6 by clicking on them. Circles turned orange after being clicked on, and
participants could unselect them. Once they had clicked on 6 circles, participants were
given feedback for 2000 ms: Their correct choices turned green, and the incorrect ones
red. They were also given the percentage of correct choices.
Further characteristics of the different MOT experiments are given in Table 1.
Working memory. The WM experiments used the change detection method
(e.g., Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Phillips, 1974; Vogel, Woodman,
& Luck, 2001). Participants were informed that they would see a number of objects on
the screen, and, after a delay, a second array of objects. They had to decide whether
any of the objects had changed. Each trial started with a fixation cross (76 × 76 pixels;
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5.5 × 5.5o) of 1000 ms, the sample array for durations between 2000 ms and 4000 ms
(see Table 2 for the specific durations), a retention delay of 900 ms, and finally the test
array. The presentation duration of the test array was always identical to that of the
sample array. Participants had to indicate with the arrow keys whether one of the
objects had changed between the sample and the test array (up: change; down: no
change). Following this, they were given feedback for 2000 ms.
The arrays contained an even number of objects between 2 and 10 (see Table 2),
either all faces, all cars (pure conditions), or half faces and half cars (mixed condition).
All three conditions were equally frequent.
The initial positioning of the objects was identical to that in the multiple object
experiments.
Familiarity judgment. In Experiments 1, 2b and 3b, we assessed the
participants’ familiarity with the stimuli. They were asked to rate, on a scale from 1 to
5, whether they would recognize the face and the car if they saw it in the street.
Sample size and participants
In the experiments below, we aimed for 24 participants per experiment. However,
we also report some pilot experiments for which the whole sample has not been
acquired. Further, in the analyses below, we excluded participants who scored at less
than 50% correct for set-size 6. We considered that participants performing at less than
50% clearly did not pay attention to the task. For example, in the click-all method,
even tracking a single item would yield a percentage of correct responses of about 55%,
and, if participants can track about 3 items, their percentage of correct responses should
be about 67% (Hulleman, 2005). The reason for excluding participants based on set-size
6 is because this set-size was present in all experiments. The number of excluded
participants is given in Tables 1 and 2.
The final numbers of participants in each experiment are given in Tables 1 and 2.
In total, 107 participants (76 females, mean age 21.7 y, range 18 – 34) took part in the
MOT experiments, and 98 participants (68 females, mean age 21.1 y, range 18-30) took
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part in the WM experiments. They were recruited from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra
community, and tested in sessions of 1.5 h that comprised other unrelated experiments
(generally on statistical learning) in addition to the current experiments.
Meta-analyses
For readability, we first present the results of our meta-anlyses, before presenting
the individual experiments in more detail. In the meta-analyses, we focus on set-size 6,
because the effects were most consistent at this set-size. On the one hand, it seems
plausible that the effects might be maximal at an intermediate set-size, as it avoids both
ceiling and floor effects. On the other hand, choosing a set-size based on the data
inflates the type I error rate. Given the weakness of the results presented below, this is
a serious caveat.
To compare the results across the MOT experiments and the WM experiments, we
use difference scores, where a difference score between two conditions C1 and C2 is
defined as the normalized difference (C2 − C1)/(C2 + C1).
In all (meta-) analyses, we discarded the first block as training.
Multiple object tracking
Pure vs. mixed displays. In our first meta-analysis, we averaged the score
from the pure conditions (i.e., either all cars or all faces), and compared it to the mixed
condition in a difference score. Positive difference scores indicate an advantage for pure
displays over mixed displays.
A mixed-effect meta-analysis (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010)
combined the results for set-size 6 for Experiments 1-3 (100 participants in total). As
shown in Figure 1, we observed a weak pure advantage, dmeta-analysis = .023, SE = .0007,
CI.95= .0008, .037, Z = 3.04, p = .002. We also entered all difference scores into a t
test against 0, and observed a weak advantage for the pure conditions (d = .026, SD =
.086), t(99) = 3.0, p = .0034, Cohen’s d = .3, CI.95 = .0087, .0429.
4 The likelihood
ratio against the null hypothesis was 8.96 after correction with the Bayesian
4The significance level was somewhat smaller with a signed rank test, V = 2958, p = .012.
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Information Criterion, and 31.63 after correction with the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC). Fifty-four participants showed a pure advantage, 41 a mixed advantage, and 5
had a difference score of exactly 0. There were no consistent results for other set-sizes.5
Faces vs. cars. We also asked whether, for set-size 6, there was a processing
advantage for faces over cars. In the analyses below, positive difference scores indicate a
face advantage.
As shown in Figure 2, a meta-analysis (100 participants in total) did not detect a
deviation from chance, dmeta-analysis = .002, SE = .003, CI.95 = -.005, .009, Z = .62,
p = .534, nor did a combined t-test, (d = .004, SD = .078), t(99) = .48, p = .635,
Cohen’s d = .048, CI.95 = -.012, .019.
6 The likelihood ratio in favor of the null
hypothesis was 8.93 after BIC correction, and 2.53 after AIC correction. There were 43
participants with a face advantage, 43 participants with a car advantage, and 14
participants with a difference score of exactly 0.
Working memory experiments
Pure vs. mixed displays. As shown in Figure 3, a mixed meta-analysis for
set-size 6 (97 participants) revealed a significant mixed advantage, dmetanalysis = -.021,
SE = .009, CI.95 = -.039, -.003, Z = 2.26, p = .024, as did a combined t-test of all
experiments (d = -.021, SD = .094), t(96) = 2.17, p = .032, Cohen’s d = .22, CI.95 =
-.04, -.002.7 The likelihood ratio in favor of the alternative hypothesis was 1.07 after
5Given that, in some experiments, we observed weak mixed advantages for set-sizes 2 and 4, we also
performed a meta-analysis for these set-sizes in the experiments where these set sizes were administered
(i.e., Experiments 1 and 3b, 44 participants in total). For set-size 2, the meta-analysis did not detect
a deviation from chance, dmeta-analysis = -.009 SE =.0097, CI.95 = -.0285, .0096, Z = -.968, p = .333.
Entering the combined difference scores into a t-test did not detect a deviation from chance either (d =
-.000, SD = .035), t(43) = 1.64, p = .107, Cohen’s d = .25, CI.95 = -.019, .002; a signed rank test was not
significant either, V = 75, p = .268. Correcting with the Bayesian Information Criterion, the likelihood
ratio in favor of the null hypothesis was 1.72. However, after correction with the Akaike information
criterion, we observed a likelihood ratio of 1.29 in favor of the alternative hypothesis (.78 in favor of the
null hypothesis). We thus tentatively conclude that the significant mixed advantages we observed for
set-size 2 were type I errors.
For set-size 4, the mixed-factor meta-analysis did not detect a deviation from chance, dmeta-analysis = -
.012, SE = .009, CI.95 = -.030, .007, Z = -1.25, p =.211. However, a combined t-test reached significance,
(d = -.012, SD = .040), t(43) = 2.05, p = .0465, Cohen’s d = .31, CI.95 = -.025, -.0002); a signed rank
test was significant as well, V = 121, p = .0219. Further, likelihood analysis favored the alternative
hypothesis (Λ = 1.23 after BIC correction and Λ = 2.72 after AIC correction). It thus is unclear whether
there is a mixed advantage at set-size 4.
6A signed rank test did not differ from chance either, V = 1735, p = .561.
7A signed rank test differed from chance as well, V = 1378, p = .0234.
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BIC correction, and 3.72 after AIC correction. 57 participants had a mixed advantage,
30 a pure advantage, and 10 had a difference score of exactly 0.
Cars vs. faces. Curby and Gauthier (2007) showed that, at least for long
encoding durations, faces are better remembered than other objects (but see Wong et
al., 2008). We thus compare whether our results reveal a similar effect, by conducting a
meta-analysis of the difference score between face only trials and car only trials.
As shown in Figure 4, a meta-analysis for set-size 6 (97 participants) revealed a
significant face advantage, d = .023, SE = .005, CI.95 = .012, .033, Z = 4.21,p =
.00003, though a combined t-test was only marginal (d = .024, SD = .121), t(96) =
1.93, p = .057, Cohen’s d = .2, CI.95 = -.0007, .048.
8 The likelihood ratio is 1.54 in
favor of the null hypothesis after BIC correction, but in favor of the alternative
hypothesis after AIC correction (Λ = 2.25). 43 participants had a face advantage, 31 a
car advantage and 23 a difference score of exactly 0.
Discussion
In the current experiments, we asked to what extent visual attention and visual
WM share common properties. Based on earlier results suggesting that it might be
easier to memorize mixed sets (Feigenson & Halberda, 2008; Wood, 2008; Wong et al.,
2008) but that it might be harder to track mixed sets (at least when the sets are defined
by simple features; Erlikhman et al., 2013), we sought to directly contrast parallel
attention and WM in their respective sensitivity to category information, using identical
stimuli.
Meta-analyses of our experiments revealed a small pure advantage for MOT
experiments, and a small mixed advantage for WM experiments, at least for set-size 6.
As shown in Figure 5, the difference scores were significantly larger for MOT
experiments than for WM experiments, t(195) = 3.62, p = .0004, Cohen’s d = .516.
This difference was confirmed by a signed rank test, p = .0002, as well as by comparing
the counts of participants having pure, mixed and no advantages, using Fisher’s test,
p = .0035. Further, a mixed model analysis on the difference scores with set-size and
8A signed rank test was significant as well; V = 1011, p = .043.
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task (MOT vs. WM) as fixed factors, their interactions as well as participants and
choice type (click-all vs. up/down) as random factors revealed that the difference score
was higher for set-size 6 (with a reference level of 2), β = .041, SE = .018, p = .031, but
that, for set-size 6, the difference score was reduced in the WM experiments β = -.053,
SE = .026, p = .038.
In line with previous results, we thus tentatively conclude that visual attention
and visual WM have different properties and hence are likely not to share all of their
underlying mechanisms.9
However, while the MOT experiments differed from the WM experiments in the
effects of the category structure of the stimuli with a medium effect size (Cohen’s d =
.516), the effects in the individual tasks were fairly weak, and, as we will now show, not
observed in all experiments.
Results of individual experiments
The meta-analyses above revealed a small advantage for pure displays in MOT
experiments, and a small advantage for mixed displays in WM experiments. While the
effect sizes were rather small in both cases, we note that these results are in line with
previous results in both MOT (Erlikhman et al., 2013; Horowitz et al., 2007; Makovski
& Jiang, 2009a) and WM (e.g., Feigenson & Halberda, 2008; Wood, 2008; Wong et al.,
2008). However, these effects did not emerge in all experiments. We thus report the
individual experiments below, noting in each case to what extent they were consistent
with the meta-analysis above.
Multiple object tracking
Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, participants had to track 2, 4 or 6 objects
among 12 items in total. At the end of the tracking phase, a single object was
highlighted, and participant had to indicate whether it was among the target objects.
9While performance did not differ between car and face trials in MOT experiments, we observed
a small face advantage for WM experiments. However, the face advantage did not differ significantly
between MOT and WM experiments, either in a t-test, t(195) = 1.38, p = .17, Cohen’s d = .196, or in
a signed rank test, p = .185, or when comparing counts of face vs. car vs. no advantages, p = .131.
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Participants completed three blocks with 36 trials each.
We analyze the different set-sizes individually, both because not all experiments
below comprise all set-sizes, and because Levene’s test indicated differences in the
variance of the difference scores at different set sizes. While we report t-tests, the
pattern of significance is unchanged with a signed rank test.
For set-size 2, the difference score (M = .0003, SD = .033) did not differ
significantly from zero, t(23) = .042, p = .967, Cohen’s d = .0085, CI.95 = -.014, .014.
For set-size 4, the difference score (M = -.021, SD = .039) revealed a mixed advantage,
t(23) = 2.65, p = .014, Cohen’s d = .54, CI.95 = -.037, -.0046. In contrast, with set-size
6, the difference score (M = .08, SD = .12) revealed a pure advantage, t(23) = 3.32,
p = .003, Cohen’s d = .68, CI.95 = .03, .13. The distribution of the number of
participants with mixed and pure advantages is shown in Table 3; performance in terms
of the percentage of correct responses is shown in Figure 6.
Participants were highly familiar with the face (Lionel Messi; M = 4.75, SD = .85;
on a scale of 1 to 5) and also reasonably familiar with the car (M = 3.54, SD = 1.59).
Experiments 2a and 2b. In Experiments 2a and 2b, participants had to track
6 items among 12 items in total. At the end of the tracking phase, the items changed to
white circles, and participants had to click on all targets. There were 4 blocks with 30
trials each. The difference between Experiments 2a and 2b was that in Experiment 2b
(but not in Experiment 2a), participants had to rate their familiarity with the objects.
As for Experiment 1, we report t-tests, but the pattern of significance is unchanged with
a signed rank test.
Given that the difference scores did not differ between Experiments 2a and 2b,
F (1,45) = .08, p = .779, η2p= .002, we combined the experiments. The difference scores
(M = .012, SD = .031) indicated a small pure advantage, t(46) = 2.58, p = .013,
Cohen’s d = .38, CI.95 = .003, .021. Counts of participants showed pure, mixed or no
advantages are shown in Table 3.
Participants in Experiment 2b rated the face as highly familiar (M = 4.39, SD =
.89) and also the car as reasonably familiar (M = 3.78, SD = 1.35).
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Experiments 3a and 3b. Experiment 3a was a replication of set-size 6 in
Experiment 1, except that the frequency of mixed and pure trials was equated. There
were 4 blocks of 32 trials. Experiment 3b was an exact replication of Experiment 1,
except that it comprised four rather than three blocks. Again, we report t-tests, but the
pattern of significance is unchanged with a signed rank test.
In Experiment 3a, the difference score (M = .009, SD = .05) failed to differ from
chance, t(8) = .51, p = .621, Cohen’s d = .17, CI.95 = -.030, .047, potentially due to
the small sample size.
In Experiment 3b, we observed a small pure advantage for set-size 2 (M = -.019,
SD = .035), t(19) = -2.48, p = .0226, Cohen’s d = .55, CI.95 = -.035, -.003. For set-size
4, the difference scores did not differ from chance (M = -.002, SD = .041), t(19) = .25,
p = .804, Cohen’s d = .056, CI.95 = -.021, .017. For set-size 6, the difference score did
not differ from chance either (M = .003, SD = .12), t(19) = .1, p = .923, Cohen’s d =
.022, CI.95 = -.05228, .057. The counts of participants showing pure and mixed
advantages in shown in Table 3.
In sum, in Experiments 3a and 3b we do not find the same effects as in
Experiments 1 and 2.
Working memory
Experiment 4. In Experiment 4, participants had to detect changes in arrays of
2, 4, 6, 8 or 10 cars or faces. The presentation duration was 3 s for the sample array.
There were 4 blocks of 60 trials each.
As in the MOT experiments above, we analyze the set-sizes individually. As
above, a signed rank test yielded the same pattern of significance as a t-test.
The difference score did not differ from chance for any of the set-sizes: Set-size 2:
M = -.011, SD = .041, t(18) = 1.14, p = .27, Cohen’s d = .26, CI.95 = -.030, .009;
set-size 4: M = -.016, SD = .093, t(18) = .72, p = .478, Cohen’s d = .17, CI.95 = -.061,
.030; set-size 6: M = -.026, SD = .116, t(18) = .99, p = .333, Cohen’s d = .23, CI.95 =
-.082, .029; set-size 8:M = .015, SD = .162, t(18) = .39, p = .698, Cohen’s d = .091,
CATEGORIES IN WM AND MOT 20
CI.95 = -.063, .093; set-size 10: M = .017, SD = .152, t(18) = .5, p = .625, Cohen’s
d = .11, CI.95 = -.056, .091.
Counts of participants showing pure, mixed or no advantages are shown in Table 4;
the performance in terms of the percentage of correct responses is shown in Figure 7.
Experiment 5. In Experiment 5, participants had to detect changes in arrays of
4, 6 or 8 cars or faces. The presentation duration was 3 s for the sample array. There
were 6 blocks of 36 trials each.
For set-size 6, we observed a significant mixed advantage, where the difference
score indicated better performance for pure displays (M = -.034, SD = .08), t(23) =
2.07, p = .0498, Cohen’s d = .42, CI.95 = -.067, -.00004. In contrast, the difference
score did not differ from chance for set-size 4 (M = -.012, SD = .054), t(23) = 1.09,
p = .289, Cohen’s d = .22, CI.95 = -.035, .011, nor for set-size 8 (M = -.017, SD =
.118), t(23) = .72, p = .481, Cohen’s d = .15, CI.95 = -.067, .033.
Experiment 6a and 6b. Experiment 6a was a replication of set-size 6 from
Experiment 5, except that we used 6 blocks with 40 trials each. Experiment 6b was an
exact replication of Experiment 5.
In Experiment 6a, the difference score failed to differ from zero (M = -.0105,
SD = .045), t(9) = .74, p = .477, Cohen’s d = .23, CI.95 = -.043, .022, perhaps due to
the small sample size.
In Experiment 6b, the difference score did not deviate from zero either for set-size
4 (M = -.023, SD = .079), t(23) = -1.39, p = .177, Cohen’s d = .28, CI.95 = -.056,
.011, or for set-size 6 (M = .0008, SD = .0896), t(23) = .04, p = .967, Cohen’s d =
.009, CI.95 = -.037, .039, or for set-size 8 (M = -.005, SD = .094), t(23) = -.28, p =
.782, Cohen’s d = .06, CI.95 = -.045, .034.
Experiment 7. Experiment 7 was identical to Experiment 4, except that the
sample array was presented for 2 s rather than 3 s.
The difference score did not deviate from chance for any set-size, set-size 2: (M =
-.012, SD = .039), t(9) = -.99, p = .349, Cohen’s d = .31, CI.95 = -.040, .016; set-size 4:
(M = -.007, SD = .123), t(9) = -.17, p = .87, Cohen’s d = .053, CI.95 = -.095, .081;
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set-size 6: (M = .017, SD = .093), t(9) = .59, p = .572, Cohen’s d = .19, CI.95 =
-.0495, .084; set-size 8: (M = .145, SD = .214), t(9) = 2.14, p = .061, Cohen’s d = .68,
CI.95 = -.008, .298; set-size 10: (M = -.025, SD = .130), t(9) = -.61, p = .558, Cohen’s
d = .19, CI.95 = -.118, .068.
Experiment 8. Experiment 8 was identical to Experiment 4, except that the
sample array was presented for 4 s rather than 3 s.
The difference score did not deviate from zero for any of the set-sizes, set-size 2:
(M = .003, SD = .050), t(9) = .2, p = .844, Cohen’s d = .064, CI.95 = -.032, .039;
set-size 4: (M = -.025, SD = .07), t(9) = -1.03, p = .33, Cohen’s d = .33, CI.95 =
-.080, .030; set-size 6: (M = -.0795, SD = .116), t(9) = -2.17, p = .058, Cohen’s d =
.69, CI.95 = -.162, .003; set-size 8: (M = .051, SD = .122), t(9) = 1.3, p = .225,
Cohen’s d = .41, CI.95 = -.037, .138; set-size 10: (M = .037, SD = .129), t(9) = .9, p =
.39, Cohen’s d = .29, CI.95 = -.055, .129.
General Discussion
What types of mechanisms underlie our cognitive capacity limitations? Following
Miller’s (1956) seminal paper, a prominent view has been that capacity limitations in
different domains might be interrelated (see Cowan, 2001, 2015), perhaps because they
are all based on a parallel individuation system. While some results supported this view
(e.g., Chesney & Haladjian, 2011; Knops et al., 2014; Piazza et al., 2011; see also Huang
et al., 2012; Oksama & Hyo¨na¨, 2004, for individual differences approaches), there is also
a growing literature suggesting that VWM might not rely on a parallel individuation
system. For example, there seems to be relatively little cross-talk between a MOT task
and a VWM task (Fougnie & Marois, 2006; Hollingworth & Hwang, 2013; H. Zhang et
al., 2010), and the effects that WM was thought to exert on attention can also stem
from LTM (Fan & Turk-Browne, 2016).
Similarly, the specific value of the capacity limitations is not necessarily diagnostic
for the underlying mechanisms. In the case of MOT experiments, the tracking capacity
seems to depend on task parameters such as the speed of the objects (e.g., Alvarez &
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Franconeri, 2007; Franconeri et al., 2010; Holcombe & Chen, 2012). In the case of WM
experiments, a variety of factors influence the observed memory capacities (see
introduction). As a result, the historic assumption that different cognitive capacities
share a numeric value might be little more than a coincidence due to the way in which
these capacities have been tested.
The current results are consistent with this view, suggesting that WM limitations
cannot be explained just based on attentional limitations. Indeed, attention and WM
seem to have different properties: MOT performance was slightly better in pure displays
than in mixed displays, while WM performance was slightly better with mixed displays.
These effects were rather weak, but are consistent with earlier results on both MOT
(Erlikhman et al., 2013; Makovski & Jiang, 2009a) and WM (e.g., Feigenson &
Halberda, 2008; Wood, 2008; Wong et al., 2008). In particular, the effect of category
membership seems to differ between MOT and WM experiments, respectively. While
this effect was not large, it was not expected to be so. Considering the primitive nature
of the mechanisms involved in WM and MOT, the very fact of finding that categories
differentially affect them is remarkable. We thus tentatively conclude that WM and
MOT do not rely on the same mechanisms.10
Do our results rely on category-membership or visual similarity?
While MOT and WM seem to react differently to manipulations of
group-membership, it is important to ask which aspects of this manipulation drove
these differences. In fact, not only did our different-category items belong to different
categories, but they also had different visual features. As a result, differences in category
membership or on visual feature composition might affect MOT and WM performance,
and might also affect them differently. While the current data do not allow us to tease
apart these possibilities, we speculate that WM performance might be more affected by
category membership, while MOT performance might be more sensitive to similarity in
10We draw this conclusion for the change detection paradigm where all items are presented simultane-
ously, as this paradigm provided the most consistent evidence for fixed visual WM capacity limitations.
However, it is possible that the link between MOT and WM might be stronger when the WM paradigm
has a temporal component, for example when items are presented and tested sequentially (e.g., Endress
& Potter, 2012; Intraub, 1980; Potter, Staub, Rado, & O’Connor, 2002).
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perceptual features. This speculation is based on a number of observations. With
respect to WM, it is well known that items have to be encoded categorically for adults
to have non-trivial WM capacities (e.g., Olsson & Poom, 2005). Likewise, in infants and
children, visually identical objects are memorized as if they belong to different
categories if they are given distinct verbal labels (e.g., Feigenson & Halberda, 2008).
Given the close two-way relationship between verbal labels and categories (e.g., Balaban
& Waxman, 1997; Markman, 1994; Waxman & Markow, 1995), these results suggest
that category membership might be critical to WM. This view is also consistent with
recent findings suggesting that memory items are stored in those brain regions where
they are processed to begin with (e.g., Lee, Kravitz, & Baker, 2013; Riggall & Postle,
2012; Sreenivasan, Vytlacil, & D’Esposito, 2014; Sreenivasan, Curtis, & D’Esposito,
2014). As items from different categories likely are stored in different regions, this might
reduce interference among memory representations, and thus lead to better memory.
In the case of MOT, performance can be affected by simple perceptual features
such as color (e.g., Erlikhman et al., 2013; Makovski & Jiang, 2009a; Sto¨rmer et al.,
2011), and, more generally, by perceptual grouping (e.g., Keane et al., 2011; Scholl et
al., 2001; Yantis, 1992). To the extent that colors are not perceived as categories,
category structure might thus be more important for WM than for MOT. If this
speculation is correct, it would suggest another way in which WM and MOT dissociate.
Further research is needed to test this possibility.
Explaining earlier evidence for a general cognitive capacity
The arguments provided thus far do not imply that there is no relation between
attention, small number processing and WM. In fact, data such as Piazza et al.’s (2011)
correlation between the subitizing range and VWM capacity still require an
explanation. We speculatively envision three such explanations. Our first account is
maybe the most deflationary one. Given that MOT performance correlates with
performance on tasks that, at least intuitively, have no obvious mechanistic relationship
to parallel individuation (e.g., to report colors, Huang et al., 2012), it is possible that all
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tasks that require processing of visual objects are linked through some common factors
such as general vigilance or compliance with the task.
Our second account is based on the observation that, at least in the case of WM
and MOT, there might be a common limitation that does not imply a common
mechanism. Specifically, Franconeri, Alvarez, and Cavanagh (2013) suggested that, in
MOT experiments, objects might interfere with each other when they pass close to each
other, and that this interference limits how many objects we can track (see also Zhong,
Ma, Wilson, Liu, & Flombaum, 2014, for a related model).
With respect to (visual) WM, Endress and Potter (2014) argued that proactive
interference was a common feature of many WM experiments, due to the reuse the same
set of limited items across many trials.11 Accordingly, they showed that there are no
clear bounds to how many items we can temporarily remember when proactive
interference is minimized (though it is not clear to what extent memory is limited when
participants have to encode spatial information; see e.g. Banta Lavenex et al., 2015;
Makovski, 2016). Further, Endress and Szabo´ (in press) provided mathematical proofs
that limited memory capacity estimates are essentially an inevitable consequence of the
mere existence of inter-item interference. Both MOT and WM might thus be
constrained by inter-item interference, though the mechanisms that are susceptible to
interference likely differ across these tasks.
Our third speculative account is that WM might use a parallel attentional system
to individuate items that need to be retained; however, once the memory items are
individuated, WM might also be constrained by other limiting factors. That is, WM
and MOT might rely on a common set of mechanisms, but also on other mechanisms
that are different across the tasks. If so, it will be important to perform more targeted
experiments to find out which mechanisms are shared, and which are not. Under either
of these accounts, the current results suggest that WM and parallel attention may have
at least partially dissociable properties, and might thus not rely on the same
11For example, in Luck and Vogel’s (1997) change detection experiment, participants had to remember
color patches, such that 7 colors where reused across hundreds of trials. Hence, the participants faced
the question to decide whether they had seen a given color in the current trial, or one of the preceding
trials, leading to proactive interference.
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mechanisms.
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Table 3
Counts of a participants with pure vs. mixed advantages in the MOT experiments
Set-size Exp. 1 Exps. 2a & 2b Exps. 3a & 3b
Pure None Mixed Pure None Mixed Pure None Mixed
2 5 14 5 NA NA NA 1 10 9
4 2 7 15 NA NA NA 5 7 8
6 15 3 6 27 1 19 12 1 16




























































































































































































































































































Exp 2a (click all)
Exp 2b (click all)
Exp 3a (yes/no)
Exp 3b (yes/no)
Figure 1 . Distribution of individual difference scores (pure-mixed)/(pure+mixed) across
the different multiple object tracking experiments. Positive difference scores indicate a
processing advantage for pure (i.e., car or face) displays, while negative difference scores
indicate an advantage for mixed (car and face) displays. Circles represent individual
participants; the solid line represents the density estimate with a Gaussian kernel and a
bandwidth of .01615 (as determined by the Sheather-Jones method). Across
experiments, participants had a small pure advantage.
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Exp 2a (click all)
Exp 2b (click all)
Exp 3a (yes/no)
Exp 4b (yes/no)
Figure 2 . Distribution of individual difference scores (car-face)/(car+face) across the
different multiple object tracking experiments. Positive difference scores indicate a
processing advantage for car displays, while negative difference scores indicate an
advantage for face displays. Circles represent individual participants; the solid line
represents the density estimate with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of .00895 (as
determined by the Sheather-Jones method). Across experiments, participants showed
no advantage in either direction.






































































































Figure 3 . Distribution of individual difference scores (pure-mixed)/(pure+mixed) across
the different change detection experiments. Positive difference scores indicate a
processing advantage for pure (i.e., car or face) displays, while negative difference scores
indicate an advantage for mixed (car and face) displays. Circles represent individual
participants; the solid line represents the density estimate with a Gaussian kernel and a
bandwidth of .0293 (as determined by the Sheather-Jones method). Across experiments,
participants had a small mixed advantage.
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Figure 4 . Distribution of individual difference scores (car-face)/(car+face) across the
different change detection experiments. Positive difference scores indicate a processing
advantage for car displays, while negative difference scores indicate an advantage for face
displays. Circles represent individual participants; the solid line represents the density
estimate with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of .01966 (as determined by the
Sheather-Jones method). Across experiments, participants had a small face advantage.
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Figure 5 . Distribution of individual difference scores (pure-mixed)/(pure+mixed) across
multiple object tracking (red) and working memory (turquoise) experiments. Positive
difference scores indicate a processing advantage for pure (i.e., car or face) displays,
while negative difference scores indicate an advantage for mixed (car and face) displays.
Circles represent individual participants; the shaded areas represent the corresponding
density estimates. Across experiments, the pure advantage was larger for MOT
experiments than for WM experiments, indicating the MOT experiments showed a
small pure advantage while WM experiments showed a small mixed advantage.
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Choice type yes/no Click all
Figure 6 . Performance in terms of the percentage of correct responses in the MOT
experiments. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
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Experiment 4 Experiment 5 Experiment 6a
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Array Size 4 6 8
Figure 7 . Performance in terms of the percentage of correct responses in the WM
experiments. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
CATEGORIES IN WM AND MOT 47
Appendix
Multiple object tracking algorithm
// The code be low shows the a l gor i thm f o r o b j e c t j
// The o b j e c t s curren t 2D v e l o c i t i e s i n i t i a l l y d e f i n e the
↪→ d i sp l a c em e n t s in the x and y d i r e c t i o n
// The v e c t o r C u r r e n t O b j e c t V e l o c i t i e s s t o r e s the norms o f the
↪→ v e l o c i t i e s ( i . e . , t h e i r magnitudes )
// o f a l l o b j e c t s .
// I n i t i a l l y , a l l o b j e c t s are a s s i g n e d random v e l o c i t i e s . At
↪→ each time step , v e l o c i t i e s change to another
// random v a l u e wi th p r o b a b i l i t y . 1 .
double MaxVelocity =10.4;
DeltaX [ j , i ]= Cur r en tOb j e c tVe l o c i t i e s [ j ]*Math . Cos (
↪→ CurrentObjec tDi rec t ions [ j ]*Math . PI /180 .0 ) ;
DeltaY [ j , i ]= Cur r en tOb j e c tVe l o c i t i e s [ j ]*Math . Sin (
↪→ CurrentObjec tDi rec t ions [ j ]*Math . PI /180 .0 ) ;
// Next , the w a l l r e p u l s i o n components are added
double LeftScreenEdgeRepuls ionMagnitude=Math . Exp(−0.5*
↪→ NormDistanceToLeftScreenEdge/ WallRepulsionSigma ) ;
double RightScreenEdgeRepulsionMagnitude=Math . Exp(−0.5*
↪→ NormDistanceToRightScreenEdge/ WallRepulsionSigma ) ;
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double TopScreenEdgeRepulsionMagnitude=Math . Exp(−0.5*
↪→ NormDistanceToTopScreenEdge/ WallRepulsionSigma ) ;
double BottomScreenEdgeRepulsionMagnitude=Math . Exp(−0.5*
↪→ NormDistanceToBottomScreenEdge/ WallRepulsionSigma ) ;
DeltaX [ j , i ]=DeltaX [ j , i ]+MaxVelocity *(Math . Cos (0 ) *
↪→ LeftScreenEdgeRepuls ionMagnitude+Math . Cos (Math . PI ) *
↪→ RightScreenEdgeRepulsionMagnitude ) ;
DeltaY [ j , i ]=DeltaY [ j , i ]+MaxVelocity *(Math . Sin (Math . PI /2 . 0 ) *
↪→ TopScreenEdgeRepulsionMagnitude+Math . Sin (3 . 0*Math . PI /2 . 0 ) *
↪→ BottomScreenEdgeRepulsionMagnitude ) ;
// F i n a l l y , the mutual r e p u l s i o n components among o b j e c t s are
↪→ added
For ( int j j =0; j j<ObjectNumber ; j j ++)
{
// Object j doesn ’ t i n t e r a c t wi th i t s e l f
I f ( j j==j ) continue ;
. . .
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DeltaX [ j , i ]=DeltaX [ j , i ]−MaxVelocity*Math . Exp(−0.5*
↪→ NormTwoObjectDistance/ ObjectRepulsionSigma ) *Math
↪→ . Cos ( Theta ) ;
DeltaY [ j , i ]=DeltaY [ j , i ]−MaxVelocity*Math . Exp(−0.5*
↪→ NormTwoObjectDistance/ ObjectRepulsionSigma ) *Math . Sin ( Theta
↪→ ) ;
. . .
}
